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ARTHUR J. BURKE, GABRIEL CASTAREDA, PAUL S. CRAMPTON, JOHN DAVIES,
RONAN P. HARTY, AND ALICI VAN CAUWELAERT*
I. Developments in the United States
The year 1998 saw a number of significant developments in the area of international antitrust
and competition law. The following provides a brief overview of some of these developments,
including: (i) several judicial decisions in the fields of jurisdiction and forum non conveniens;
(ii) prosecutions of alleged international cartels; (iii) merger enforcement activities; and (iv)
international cooperation efforts among competition agencies.
A. PROCEDURAL DEVELOPMENTS
Several significant court cases in 1998 addressed the international jurisdictional scope of the
U.S. antitrust laws, along with related concepts such as comity and forum non conveniens.
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Comity
In Caribbean Broadcast System, Ltd. v. Cabe & Wireless PLC,1 the D.C. Circuit reversed the
district court and held that the plaintiff, the owner of an FM radio station in the Eastern
Caribbean, had made sufficient allegations to establish jurisdiction under the Foreign Trade
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (FTAIA). The plaintiff alleged that the defendants, the
owner of a competing FM radio station and a worldwide telecommunications company, had
monopolized and conspired to monopolize the market for English language radio advertising
in the Eastern Caribbean and that this had harmed U.S.-based advertisers. The court held that
the plaintiff had alleged a "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on export
trade or commerce sufficient to establish jurisdiction under clause I(B) of FTAIA.3
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2. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1994) [hereinafter FTAIA].
3. See id
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The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, in Beutnoare PLC v.
Tupperware Corp.,' held that it had jurisdiction to consider a claim by a British housewares
supplier that an American firm had instituted "sham legal proceedings" overseas in order to
exclude the firm from the U.S. market.
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, in Millicom International Cellular, S.A.
v. Republic of Costa Rica,6 addressed the scope of U.S. federal court jurisdiction under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA).' The court dismissed a complaint against the
government of Costa Rica, a Costa Rican instrumentality, and a subsidiary of the instrumentality,
which alleged that these entities had acted unlawfully to exclude the plaintiffs from the Costa
Rican cellular telephone market.' The court held that a foreign state was presumptively immune
under FSIA except in situations where the foreign state engaged in certain "commercial activity"
or "expropriation."' The "commercial activity" exception was not available because the Costa
Rican government's activities did not take place in the United States, nor did they have a
"direct effect" on the United States.' The "expropriation" exception was unavailable because
the plaintiffs had not exhausted the remedies available in Costa Rica for their alleged injuries."
In Filetecb S.A.R.L v. France T wcom S.A., the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York held that it had subject matter jurisdiction to consider antitrust claims against
France Tai&om, a foreign telecommunications and marketing corporation in which the French
government is a majority shareholder, under FSIA and FTAIA. 2 The district court dismissed
the claims against France Tilicom on international comity grounds, however, explaining that
the defendant had presented a "substantial claim" that there was a conflict between the Sherman
Act" and French law. '4 The Second Circuit reversed the finding of jurisdiction, holding that
there were significant factual disputes concerning whether France Taicom's level of'"commercial
activity" in the United States was sufficient to establish jurisdiction under FSIA." The court
also noted that there was as yet no basis for the conclusion that there was a "true conflict"
between U.S. and French law-i.e., "an allegation that compliance with the regulatory law
of both countries would be impossible."16
2. Personal Jundiction
In Frank Sexton Enterprses, Inc. v. Soit de Diffiuions Internationale Agro-Alimentaire," one
defendant, a French cooperative with a wholly-owned U.S. subsidiary, moved to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction a complaint alleging violations of the Robinson-Patman Act" and
4. Betterware PLC v. Tupperware Corp., 1998-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 72,158 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
5. See id. at 82025.
6. Millicom Int'l Cellular, S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica, 995 F. Supp. 14 (D.D.C. 1998).
7. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 a Aq, (1994).
8. See Milicom, 995 F. Supp. at 16.
9. See id at 18.
10. See id. at 19-22.
11. Se id. at 22-23.
12. Filetech S.A.R.L. v. France Telecom S.A., 978 F. Supp. 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
13. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1994).
14. See Filetecb S.A.R.L, 978 F. Supp. at 478.
15. Filetech S.A.R.L. v. France Telecom S.A., 157 F.3d 922, 932 (2d Cir. 1998).
16. See id.
17. Frank Sexton Enterprises, Inc. v. Societe de Diffusions Intemationale Agro-Alimentaire, 1998-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 1 72,264 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
18. Robinson-Patman Act: Discrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1994).
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other causes of action. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held
that it would have personal jurisdiction over the French firm only if the firm was the "alter
ego" of its U.S. subsidiary." A dose and cooperative relationship between the two firms would
be insufficient to meet this standard, while a "disregard of corporate independence" could be
sufficient to show alter ego status.' ° The evidence submitted at the time of the decision was
insufficient to show alter ego status, but did indicate a "significant interrelationship" between
the firms.' The court accordingly denied the motion to dismiss without prejudice and ordered
further discovery on the personal jurisdiction issue.2"
In Paper Systems Inc. v. Mitsubisbi Corp.,23 the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Wisconsin denied a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction made by two defendants
that were allegedly part of a conspiracy to fix the price of thermal fax paper. The plaintiff
admitted that it could not satisfy the requirements of the Wisconsin Long Arm Statute and
that the defendants did not have substantial contacts with the State of Wisconsin.24 Nevertheless,
the court held that service of process on the defendants was sufficient under 15 U.S.C. § 22
to establish personal jurisdiction.2 And while the plaintiff could not satisfy the venue provision
of 15 U.S.C. § 22, the plaintiff could rely on the general venue provision of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(d), which provides that "an alien may be sued in any district."216 The defendants had
sufficient contacts with the forum (the United States) to satisfy due process..
3. Forum Non Conveniens
In Capital Currency Excbange, N V. v. National Westminster Bank PLC,28 the Second Circuit
upheld a district court decision dismissing an antitrust conspiracy complaint brought by a Dutch
financial corporation (with New York and British affiliates) against two British banks. The
court first rejected the plaintiffs contention that the forum non conveniens doctrine did not
apply in antitrust cases based upon the holding of United States v. National City Lines, Inc.
(National City 1).92 The Second Circuit explained that National City I had been overruled by
the passage of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), which permits the transfer of cases from one federal district
court to another for the convenience of the parties.3" However, the application of § 1404(a)
was limited to situations where the more convenient forum is another U.S. district court.3'
Where the more convenient forum is a foreign country, as in Capital Curncy,2 the common
law doctrine of forum non conveniens continues to apply.
Applying the common law doctrine, the Second Circuit concluded that England was a more
appropriate forum for litigating the Dutch company's conspiracy claims." While English courts









28. Capital Currency Exch., N.V. v. National Westminster Bank PLC, 155 F.3d 603 (2d Cir. 1998).
29. United States v. National City Lines, Inc., 334 U.S. 573 (1948).
30. See Capita Currmy, 155 F.3d at 607.
31. Set id.
32. See id. at 607.
33. Set id. at 612.
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do not enforce the Sherman Act, they are bound by Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome,
which are substantively similar to the Sherman Act and which permit private actions for
monetary damages. 4 Most of the witnesses and documentary evidence in the case were located
in England; indeed, some crucial witnesses were not subject to compulsory process in the United
States.3 Finally, the fact that the real parties in interest were foreign corporations weakened
any presumption in favor of the plaintiffs choice of forum. 6 Accordingly, the Second Circuit
affirmed the dismissal of the case.
37
B. CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS FOR CARTEL AcTivrrv
In 1998, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) continued to pursue its
enforcement efforts against alleged international cartels.3 The DOJ reported that in fiscal year
1998, it set a record with nearly $270 million in fines imposed or recommended in plea
agreements.3 9
For example, in 1998 the DOJ pursued an investigation of an alleged international conspiracy
to fix the price and allocate the volume of graphite electrodes sold in the United States and
elsewhere. As a consequence of this investigation, a U.S. firm, UCAR International, Inc.,
entered a guilty plea and agreed to pay a 5110 million fine-the largest fine in antitrust history.'
In the same investigation, a Japanese firm, Showa Denko Carbon, Inc., entered a guilty plea
and agreed to pay a $29 million fine. 1
In another cartel investigation, a Japanese corporation, Fujisawa Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd.,
agreed to plead guilty and pay a fine of $20 million for allegedly participating in an international
conspiracy to fix prices and allocate markets worldwide for an industrial cleaner called sodium
gluconate. 2 This was the fifth case brought in connection with the alleged sodium gluconate
cartel.
43
The result was different in United State v. Nippon Paper Industries Co., where the government
alleged that the defendant and certain unnamed co-conspirators held a number of meetings in
Japan that culminated in an agreement to fix the price of thermal fax paper throughout North
America."4 The district court initially dismissed the indictment on the ground that U.S. criminal
law did not extend to conduct that took place entirely outside of the United States.4" The
First Circuit reversed this holding and remanded for trial." In 1998, a four-week trial ensued-
34. See id. at 609-10.
35. See id. at 611.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 612.
38. See generally Statement of Joel 1. Klein Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Business Rights, and
Competition of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Oct. 2, 1998, at 5-10.
39. See A. Douglas Melamed, Antitrw Enforcement in a Global Eonomy, Fordham Corporate Law Institute
(Oct. 22, 1998).
40. See US. Company Agr to Pay $110 Million Fine for International Compiray, Dept. of Justice, Apr. 7,
1998, available in 1998 WL 164982.
41. See Japanese Subsidiary Cbarged witb International Compiracy to Fix Prita for Graphite Electraodes in US.,
Dept. of Justice, Feb. 23, 1998, available in 1998 WL 74568.
42. See Japanese Chemical Giant to Pay $20 Million Fine, Dept. of Justice, Feb. 2 S, 1998, available in 1998
WL 86752.
43. See id.
44. United States v. Nippon Paper Industries Co., Ltd., 944 F. Supp. 55 (D. Mass 1996).
45. See id.
46. See United States v. Nippon Paper, 109 F.3d 1(lst Cir. 1997). SealsoGabriel Castafiedaetal., Inernatiimal
Antitnrt, 32 Irr'L LAw. 291, 292-93 (1998).
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the first in history involving criminal antitrust charges based on conduct that occurred entirely
outside the United States. After seven days of deliberation, the jury was unable to reach a
verdict. 7 Prosecutors indicated that they planned to retry the case.
C. INTERNATIONAL MERGER ENFORCEMENT
As the U.S. merger wave continued and accelerated in 1998, the DOJ and the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), acting pursuant to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of
1976,48 reviewed numerous proposed transactions involving international components. Several
of these transactions resulted in investigations and consent decrees designed to address potential
anticompetitive consequences of the transactions.
An example of cooperative international merger enforcement is the merger of WorldCom
and MCI, two U.S. firms with substantial overseas operations, discussed in Section IV(E). FTC
Chairman Robert Pitofsky also noted in congressional testimony that the FTC worked closely
with the European Commission to ensure expeditious clearance of two international mergers
(Daimler/Chrysler and Lucas/Varity) where the agency did not see any significant antitrust
issues.49
D. INTERNATIONAL. COOPERATION AGREEMENTS
In June 1998, the United States and the European Communities signed a new antitrust
cooperation agreement supplementing an earlier 1991 agreement"° and formally adopting the
principle of "positive comity."" In other developments, in October 1998, eleven countries in
the Western Hemisphere (including the United States) adopted a policy statement of hostility
to cartel behavior and a commitment to cooperate in international enforcement against such
behavior. 2
The International Competition Policy Advisory Committee (ICPAC), formed by the DOJ
in 1997 to discuss various international competition law issues, met on three occasions in
1998," and held three days of hearings in November 1998.4 Participants in the November
hearings included antitrust enforcement officials from around the world and topics of discussion
included enforcement cooperation, multijurisdictional mergers, and the interrelation of trade
and competition policy. ICPAC has also requested the submission of papers on these and other
subjects."
47. See United States v. Nippon Paper, 17 F. Supp. 2d 38, 39 (D. Mass. 1998).
48. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1994).
49. Sty FTC Testifies before Senate Subcommittee on International Antitrust Issues, Federal Trade Comm'n,
News Release, availabl in 1998 WL 683460 (Oct. 2, 1998).
50. See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and The Commission of the
European Communities Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws, Sept. 2 3,1991, U.S.-EC, 30
I.L.M. 1491 (Nov. 1991), ninted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,504.
51. See Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the European Communities
on the Application of Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement of Their Competition Laws, June 4, 1998,
U.S.-EC, § IV(E), 37 I.L.M. 1070 [hereinafter EC/US Positive Comity Agreement]. See also U.S. and European
Communitie Sign Antitnut Cooperation Agrnnent, Dept. of Justice, June 4,1998, availab in 1998 WL 290918.
52. Communiqu6 from Antitrust Summit of the Americas (Oct. 2, 1998).
53. Dept. ofJustice, ICPAC, Notice of Hearing, 63 Fed. Reg. 8472 (1998); Dept. ofJustice, ICPAC, Notice
of Hearing, 63 Fed. Reg. 43,195 (1998); Dept. of Justice, ICPAC, Notice of Hearing, 63 Fed. Reg. 65,244
(1998).
54. Dept. of Justice, ICPAC, Notice of Hearing, 63 Fed. Reg. 53,927-28 (1998).
55. See Dept. of Justice, Notice, International Competition Policy Advisory Committee: Request for Papers,
63 Fed. Reg. 57314 (Oct. 27, 1998).
SUMMER 1999
282 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
II. Developments in Canada
A. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE COMPETrrION Acr
On November 20, 1997, proposed amendments to the Competition Act, which have been
under active discussion sinceJune 1995, were introduced as Bill C-20 in the House of Commons.
This bill received third reading in the House of Commons in September of 1998, after it was
amended by the Industry Committee to include new statutory protections for whisdeblowers.
It was expected to be passed by the Senate and proclaimed into force prior to year end; however,
the Senate refused to pass the whistleblowing provisions on third reading in December. The
House of Commons must now decide whether to pass the bill without the whistleblowing
provisions, upon its return in early February 1999.
If Bill C-20 is passed, amendments would be made to the Competition Act's provisions
concerning pre-merger notification, misleading advertising and prohibition orders, and new
provisions would be introduced dealing with telemarketing. In addition, the Bill proposes to
amend the Criminal Code to allow judicially authorized interception, without consent, of
private communications in the context of investigations involving the basic conspiracy provisions
of the Act (§ 45), bid-rigging (§ 47) and deceptive telemarketing (§ 52.1). As might be expected,
this "wiretapping" proposal has given rise to significant controversy within Canada, and led
to a narrowing of what had been initially proposed.
For international business transactions, the proposals relating to pre-merger notification are
the most potentially relevant. The principal amendments would involve: (a) doubling the existing
seven- and twenty-one day waiting periods applicable to short-form and long-form filings, respec-
tively; (b) significantly expanding the information requirements for long-form filings; and (c) pro-
viding the Director of Investigation and Research under the act, who heads the Competition Bu-
reau (and who would be renamed the "Commissioner" if the amendments are passed), with the
ability to delay a merger for up to thirty additional days (with the possibility of a further sixty-day
extension), upon certification that a formal enquiry has been commenced and "more time is re-
quired to complete the enquiry." These proposals are unlikely to have a significant effect on
straightforward transactions, but may increase the likelihood of the bureau requiring a long-form
filing in respect oftransactions raising potential issues and will reduce the probability that merging
parties will be permitted to close a transaction prior to the completion of the bureau's review
where their transaction raises potentially serious primafacw competition issues.
B. DRAFT EU-CANADA COOPERATION AGREEMENT
OnJune 4, 1998, the Competition Bureau released an initialed version of the Draft Agreement
Between the Government of Canada and the European Communities Regarding the Application
of Their Antitrust Laws (Draft Agreement), together with initialed versions of draft interpretive
letters. The Draft Agreement is virtually identical to the version obtained in the Fall of 1997
by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). The Draft Agreement is very similar in
format, style, and content to the 1995 Canada-US Cooperation Agreement and the 1991
US-EU Cooperation Agreement. However, there are some noteworthy differences, including
stronger provisions relating to confidentiality, positive comity, and negative comity than those
contained in the 1991 US-EU Cooperation Agreement.
C. RacoRn FINES OrAINED IN LYsINE AND CrrRic AcID INvESTIGATIONS
On May 27, 1998, the Competition Bureau announced that a record fine of $16 million
(Cdn) had been imposed on Archer Daniels Midland Company (ADM) after it pleaded guilty
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to having participated in price fixing and market sharing conspiracies, contrary to paragraph
45(lXc) of the Competition Act. According to the bureau's news release, the "offences relate
to the participation of the firm in an international conspiracy to fix prices and allocate market
shares in the lysine and citric acid markets worldwide." The Agreed Statement of Facts states
that the relevant "conversations and meetings [giving rise to the unlawful agreement] occurred
in locations outside Canada." There were three counts in all. ADM was fined 59 million for
price fixing and $ 5 million for market sharing in the lysine industry, and $2 million in connection
with the citric acid conspiracy. In addition, the bureau's news release notes that ADM "has
also agreed to cooperate with the Bureau in ongoing investigations into these and other food
and feed additives." The previous record fine for a single count under the act was 52.5 million.
The charges related to the period from 1992 to 1995. According to the news release, total
Canadian sales of lysine and citric acid during that period were approximately 5 89 million and
5104 million, respectively, of which $48 million and 517 million, respectively, were made by
ADM. Therefore, its fines represented approximately twenty-nine percent and 12.5 percent
of its affected sales of lysine and citric acid, respectively, during the period of the offence.
Subsequently, several other firms pleaded guilty to having participated in the lysine and citric
acid conspiracies. On July 23, 1998, Ajinomoto Co. Inc. of Japan was fined 5 3.5 million for
one count of conspiracy in respect of the lysine matter, and Sewon America Inc., a subsidiary
of Sewon Company, Ltd. of Korea, was fined $70,000 for its involvement in that conspiracy.
Ajinomoto's fine apparently equals approximately twenty-three percent of the volume of its
affected sales during the relevant period. According to a news release issued by the Competition
Bureau, Kyowa Hakko Kogyo Company, Ltd. of Japan "was granted immunity... for having
been the first of the companies to provide evidence to the Competition Bureau in cooperation
with its investigation." Similarly, Sewon's fine "also reflects, in part, the fact that the company
cooperated with the Bureau at an early stage in this investigation."
On October 21, 1998, Jungbunzlauer International A.G. (BL), a Swiss corporation, and
Haarmann & Reimer Corporation (HR), a U.S. subsidiary of Bayer Corporation, pleaded guilty
to having participated in the conspiracy to fix prices and share markets for citric acid. HR was
fined 54.7 million and JBL was fined $2 million, of which $1.9 million related to the citric
acid conspiracy and 5100,000 related to a further conspiracy to fix prices and allocate market
shares for sodium gluconate. According to court transcripts, these fines represented approxi-
mately nineteen percent of the volume of the affected citric acid sales of HR and JBL during
the period of the offence, and 12.5 percent of JBL's affected sodium guconate sales.
D. BuREAu TOUGHENING ITS STANCE ON MERGERS
The year 1998 was noteworthy in merger enforcement policy, as the Competition Bureau
publidy opposed four mergers. This represents a significant development, in comparison with
recent years, in which only one or no mergers were challenged (although there have been some
transactions that were permitted to proceed after the merging parties undertook to address
concerns that had been raised in respect of a part of the transaction). The first rejected merger
was between Petro-Canada Inc. (Petro-Canada) and Ultramar Diamond Shamrock (UDS). On
June 22, 1998, after the parties announced the abandonment of their merger, the Competition
Bureau announced that Konrad von Finckenstein, the Director of the Bureau, "had informed
the companies of his serious concerns that the transaction would likely cause a substantial
lessening or prevention of competition in wholesale and retail petroleum markets in Quebec
and Atlantic Canada." The Bureau's News Release further stated: "In joint ventures of this
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size, there is often room to restructure a deal to alleviate competition concerns.... However,
in this instance no workable alternatives could be identified."
Subsequently, on December 1, 1998, the director filed an application under the preliminary
injunction provisions in section 100 of the Competition Act to prohibit the acquisition by
Superior Propane Inc. (Superior) of all of the issued and outstanding shares of ICG Propane
Inc. (ICG) from a wholly-owned subsidiary of Petro-Canada. This was the first contested
application filed under these provisions since they were inserted into the Competition Act in
1986. However, it was dismissed by the Competition Tribunal on December 6, 1998.
The key issue in the case was the definition of the product market. Among other things,
the director alleged that Superior and ICG would have a market share of over ninety percent
in seventeen local markets, over sixty-five percent in forty-seven markets, and over thirty-five
percent (the "safe harbour" in the director's 1991 Merger Enforcement Guidelines) in fifty-eight
of the eighty markets analyzed by the director. He further alleged that the merged entity would
be "virtually" the only supplier of propane to national accounts in Canada, which are daimed
to represent approximately twenty-two percent of total sales of the parties. In response, Superior
argued that propane competes in a broader energy market, in which it accounts for a market
share of approximately two percent. Superior further argued that "this share is dropping as a
result of competition from other sources of energy, including natural gas, fuel oil, electricity
and wood in the traditional industry segments, and with gasoline, diesel and other alternative
fuels in the automotive segment."
Among other things, Superior produced what some might consider to be a "hot document"
in the form of a letter issued by the bureau in respect of Superior's 1993 acquisition of
Premier Propane Inc. (Premier), to support its case. In that letter, the bureau concluded that
the acquisition of Premier would not likely result in a substantial lessening of competition, in
part because "there was competition as between propane and gasoline and natural gas," and
in part because "the industry had relatively low entry barriers." In response to questioning
from the tribunal, the director's counsel was unable to explain what had changed since 1993.
With this in mind, and given that the director did not introduce sufficient evidence to satisfy
the tribunal that propane competes in a distinct product market characterized by high barriers
to entry, the tribunal declined to issue the preliminary injunction. Immediately following this
decision, on December 7, 1998, the parties completed their transaction. On the same day, the
director filed an application under section 92 of the Competition Act to challenge the merger
post-dosing. On December 11, 1998, the tribunal granted an interim hold separate order on
consent, under section 104 of the act (which the tribunal observed contemplates a lower standard
than what is contemplated in section 100).
Finally, on December 14,1998, the Honourable Paul Martin, Minister of Finance (Minister),
announced that the proposed mergers between Royal Bank of Canada (RBQ and Bank of
Montreal (BMO), and between Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC) and Toronto-
Dominion Bank (TD) "will not be allowed to proceed because they are not in the best interests
of Canadians." He gave the following three principal reasons for his decision: "The mergers
would lead to an unacceptable concentration of economic power in the hands of fewer, very
large banks. They would result in a significant reduction of competition. And they would
reduce the government's policy flexibility to address potential future prudential concerns." The
mergers would have involved four of the six major banks in Canada. (Under the Bank Act,
the Minister has the ultimate authority to approve a bank merger.)
Regarding competition, the Minister noted that the Competition Bureau's "analysis is one
of the cornerstones of our decision today." In separate (publicly released) letters sent to the
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merging parties by the Director of the Bureau, it was stated that the director concluded that
the mergers "would cause higher prices and lower levels of service and choice for several key
banking services in Canada." However, what is striking from a review of those letters is that
they do not reflect the full flavor of the bureau's traditional qualitative analytical framework.
In short, they reflect a much greater emphasis on market shares and concentration, and a
reduced emphasis on qualitative factors such as barriers, to entry, the ability of remaining
competitors to discipline the exercise of market power, and the nature of change and innovation
in the relevant markets.
For example, with respect to branch banking, the letters state: "Where the combined share
of the Banks in either personal or business transaction accounts is forty-five percent or greater,
it is the Bureau's conclusion that the proposed transaction will result in a substantial lessening
of competition and would require a remedy." For the RBC/BMO transaction, there were 104
local markets in this category, while for the CIBC/TD merger there were thirty-six local markets
in this category. In addition, the bureau included various provincial markets for mid-market
loans between $1 million and 55 million in this category, for each merger. It is noteworthy
that this is the first time that the bureau has used a market share threshold as a basis for inferring
a likely anti-competitive effect.
III. Developments in Mexico
A. NEw IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS
New implementing regulations to the Federal Law on Economic Competition were issued
in March 1998. These regulations present more problems than solutions for the five-year-old
Mexican competition enforcement system. On the bright side, the new regulations try to set
out a procedural framework and certain clarifications to the merger review rules. Unfortunately,
the flaws discredit the new set of rules: (a) there is a general tendency to obstruct private actions,
granting the Federal Competition Commission (FCC) a "big brother" role to interfere in
private actions (blurring the natural boundary that should separate private actions from ex-offcio
investigations, or simply blocking the possibility of private parties opposing mergers); (b) opening
the door to predatory pricing and discrimination cases without offering proper analytical tools;
and (c) placing an extremely heavy burden of proof for the FCC (over-expansive efficiency
defenses and market definition assessment). In practice, the new regulations have made matters
more complicated, raised the costs of litigation and increased the levels of uncertainty.
B. TELECOMM CASES
The FCC issued a strong statement declaring TELMEX, the long distance and basic telephony
former state monopoly, a dominant firm in five related markets: national long distance, interna-
tional long distance, basic local service and inter-urban access and traffic. This FCC action,
according to the Federal Telecommunications Law, calls upon the Telecomm regulator to issue
new regulations to set controls upon the phone company. TELMEX, of course, has appealed
the FCC ruling.
C. MERGER CASES
After twenty months of analysis in the Grand Met/Guinness worldwide transaction, the
FCC decided to allow the Mexican portion of this transaction, subject to divestiture or licensing
of the J&B Scotch whiskey brand. The parties appealed the FCC decision, but the ruling was
affirmed.
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IV. Developments in the European Union
A. AMEND Emrs TO THE EC MERGER REGIME
Significant amendments to the EC Merger Regulation came into force in March 1998
following an intensive review process.' 6 Some of the changes are of considerable benefit to
business and are wdcome. Although the reduction in the notification thresholds is not as great
as was hoped by the business sector due to reluctance on the part of member states, a compromise
solution was reached that resulted in reduced thresholds for mergers whose effects concern at
least three member states." This is a recognition that mergers that affect a number of member
states are more appropriately dealt with at the EU level and the "one-stop-shop" principle may
provide the basis for further amendments in the future.
Most importantly the amended regulation will apply to all structural joint ventures, the
so-called "full-function" joint ventures (provided the turnover tests are met)." The European
Commission may also take Article 85 considerations into account when considering a joint
venture that raises issues of "cooperative overlap.""' This amendment will go a long way
towards removing the largely artificial distinction between concentrative and cooperative joint
ventures which owed little to commercial reality.
The provision dealing with commitments entered into by the parties (e.g., divestiture) has
been amended to allow commitments to be enforced in first phase proceedings.' ° The one-month
deadline for issuing a first phase clearance decision will be extended to six weeks where commit-
ments are offered during first phase proceedings in order to give the European Commission
sufficient time to consider the proposals without the need to open second phase proceedings.6
This will enable the parties to avoid a long and burdensome second phase investigation. This
amendment is already proving its worth, with the European Commission having accepted Phase
I undertakings in ten cases in the first nine months of the rules.
Amendments to Article 9 of the Regulation will make it easier for member states to request
a referral back to them of all or part of a particular case if a "distinct" national market is
affected.62 It will no longer be necessary for a member state to provide evidence of a threat
of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position in that distinct national market (provided
it does not itself constitute a substantial part of the common market, such as a major member
state).6 The worry here was the likely increase in references back and the increased uncertainty
for parties as to the regulator they would have to deal with. The risk of having to deal with
more than one regulator is also increased. To date this fear has not become a reality with only
three cases being referred back since March 1998.
The test will be whether the Merger Task Force (MTF) 64 will cope with the increased
workload that these changes have brought. Gbtz Drauz, the Director of the MTF, has estimated
56. Council Regulation 1310/97 of 30 June 1997 amending Council Regulation 4064/89 on the control of






62. See id. at L180/5.
63. See id.
64. The Merger Task Force (MTF) is the directorate within DG IV responsible for the application of the
EC Merger Regulation. DG IV is the Directorate General within the European Commission responsible for the
application of EC competition rules.
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that the changes will result in an increased workload of twenty to twenty-five percent for the
MTF. There is already a concern being voiced that, due to recent staff changes and increased
workloads, members of the MTF are becoming more cautious and less willing to reach pragmatic
solutions to the notification requirements. In addition, there is a risk that the Article 85 analysis
in joint venture cases may take too long and increase the number of Phase Two enquiries.
The increased workload of the European Commission is evidenced by the 224 notifications
made to the MTF in 1998 as compared to 171 in 1997 and a mere sixty in 1991. At least
fourteen of those notifications were as a result of the amended turnover thresholds. An additional
fourteen joint ventures were notified under the revised EC Merger Regulation since March
1998.
B. EUROPEAN COMMISSION COMMUNICATION ON VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
On September 30, 1998, the European Commission adopted a communication on the
application of EC competition rules to vertical restraints6 and proposed legislative amend-
ments to reflect the European Commission's evolving policy in this area. These legislative
changes must be in force before the expiry of the current system in the year 2000. The
European Commission has recognized that vertical agreements can be used pro-competitively
to promote the entry into new and risky markets, or anti-competitively to partition markets
or to exclude new entrants who could intensify competition. The European Commission
has also recognized that vertical arrangements entered into by companies with market power
give rise to more competitive concerns than those entered into by companies with lesser
market shares.
The European COmmission's policy as reflected in the COmmunication contains the following
elements:
" One umbrella block exemption applicable to all vertical agreements in the distribution
chain and concerning both goods and services.
" The listing of hard-core restrictions that will take an agreement outside the application
of the block exemption.
• The introduction of market share caps. It has not yet been decided whether one or two
market share thresholds will be introduced or the exact level of these thresholds.
* If one market share is introduced it is likely to lie in the range of twenty-five to thirty-five
percent. Agreements where the parties have market shares below this threshold are pre-
sumed either to fall outside the scope of Article 85(1) or to warrant exemption.
* In the case of a two threshold system, the first and main market share cap would be
around twenty percent. All non-hard-core restrictions between companies with market
shares below this lower threshold would be exempted. Vertical agreements between compa-
nies with market shares below the second threshold of around forty percent would only
be exempt with regard to less serious (non-exclusive) restrictions of competition.
" All vertical agreements, with the exception of those containing hard-core restrictions,
between companies having turnover of less than 150 million ECU are exempted regardless
of market share.
* The possibility of removal of the block exemption if cumulative effects give rise to a
serious restriction of competition. Any withdrawal will only have effects for the future.
6Y. Commission Communication on the application of EC Competition rules to vertical restraints, September
1998.
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* An increased role for national courts and competition authorities, giving them the power
to apply the block exemption. National competition authorities will, on the basis of dear
and well-specified criteria, be able to withdraw the benefit of the block exemption in
respect of their territory.
In order to alleviate concerns on legal certainty the European Commission has indicated
that it will take the following measures:
* Publish guidelines on the scope of application of Article 85(1) in cases above the market
share cap, its policy under Article 85(3), and its policy on the withdrawal of the benefit
of the block exemption, particularly in cumulative effects cases.
* Publish leading decisions that will assist companies in determining if a notification under
Article 85 (1) is in fact necessary.
" Adapt Article 4(2) of implementing Regulation 17 to remove the obligation to notify
vertical distribution agreements to the European Commission in order to ensure their
.legal validity. The European Commission will no longer be restricted to granting an
Article 85(3) exemption from the date of notification but will be able to grant exemption
retroactively.
If adopted, these proposals will be far-reaching and involve a major departure from the
current piecemeal approach to vertical restraints. There are many elements to be welcomed,
including the introduction of one umbrella block exemption that will cover all vertical distribution
agreements regardless of their particular form. The removal of the list of clauses that must be
present in order to benefit from the block exemption is also a welcome development and should
remove the straitjacket effect of the current block exemptions.
Although the European Commission's suggestion of a market share cap has not been warmly
welcomed by industry, who fear that it will be difficult to estimate market shares reliably,
commentators have been unable to come up with an alternative proposal. Too much should
not be made of this difficulty. Although there will always be cases where market definition is
difficult, it should be noted that many jurisdictions impose a market share test for merger
control, and companies and their advisers cope adequately.
C. CARTELS
The European Commission has confirmed its commitment to fight the creation of cartels
and to punish companies that enter into agreements with competitors to increase prices, partition
markets, or restrict production. The European Commission announced in December 1998 the
creation of a new unit within DG IV with at least twenty officials dedicated exclusively to
unveiling, pursuing, and eliminating cartels." The seriousness with which the European Commis-
sion regards cartel activity is also evidenced by the high fines that were imposed in 1998 on
the companies involved in price fixing and bid rigging in the market for district heating pipes."'
However, it should be noted that DG IV's powers in this area are considerably weaker than
those held by some competition authorities in other parts of the world, as they are unable to
impose criminal penalties or personal liability on any individual company employee.
D. STATE Am
The issue of state aid has come further into focus recently as the European Union introduces
competition through liberalization measures in areas previously excluded from competition.
66. Commission of Eur. Communities, Press Release IP/98/1060, December 3, 1998.
67. Commission of Eur. Communities, Press Release IP/98/917, October 2!, 1998.
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Member states must obtain prior approval from the European Commission in order to grant
financial aid to enterprises. The decisions that the European Commission must make in this
area are always difficult, involving complex economic analysis, and bring the European Commis-
sion into direct conflict with the member states. It is very difficult, as the case involving state
aid to the ailing French bank Credit Lyonnais case has shown, to remove politics and wider
concerns from a state aid decision. The recent efforts of the European Commission in proposing
a procedural regulation for state aid cases should tighten up the control of subsidies and weaken
the political pressures which are brought to bear.6' However, the current proposal is lacking
in a number of aspects. It does not set out dear procedural rights for third parties. Clearer
rights would allow the European Commission to benefit more from this crucial source of
information; most importantly it would place the European Commission in a better position
to verify information supplied by member states. Nor does the European Commission provide
any dear rights to the beneficiary of the aid although they have the greatest interest in ensuring
that the aid is cleared.
Although the current practice of concluding preliminary proceedings within a two-month
time limit is laid down in the proposal, no time limit is set for completion of an in-depth
investigation. The lack of a time limit is a serious weakness as it will allow political pressures
to build up as in current cases.
E. I ,Ur ATIONAL COOPERATION
Leaving aside developments within the OECD and increased dialogue on global cooperation
in competition matters (see Section II(B)), 1998 has seen continued cooperation between the
U.S. competition authorities and the European Commission. The 1991 EC/US Cooperation
Agreement on antitrust matters was supplemented with the coming into force on June 4, 1998
of the EC/US Positive Comity Agreement.69
The EC/US Positive Comity Agreement seeks to reduce the number of cases being investigated
by both a U.S. competition authority and the European Commission. The agreement expands
on the possibility provided for in the 1991 agreement of one authority requesting the other
authority to investigate a particular case. Mergers do not fall within the scope of the Positive
Comity Agreement and will continue to be monitored closely by authorities on both sides of
the Atlantic; nor does the agreement provide for exchange of confidential business information,
unless the consent of the source of the information has been obtained. To date there has only
been one request for positive comity-in January 1997 the U.S. Department ofJustice requested
the European Commission to investigate allegations of abusive practices by Amadeus, a European
computer reservation system. This investigation is ongoing.
In contrast to the tensions that arose in 1997 in relation to the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas
merger,70 the cooperation during the summer of 1998 between the U.S. Department of Justice
and the European Commission in the MCI-Worldcom merger7 provides a model for future
cooperation. The authorities were in dose contact, exchanging views, coordinating information
gathering (with the parties' consent), and holding joint meetings and settlement negotiations
68. COM (1998) 73 FINAL.
69. EC/US Positive Comity Agreement, supra note 51.
70. Commission Decision IV/IM.877 of 30July 1997 declaring a concentration compatible with the Common
Market and the Functioning of the EEA Agreement, 1997 OJ. (L 336) 16.
71. Commission Decision IV/M.1069 of 8 July 1998.
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with the parties. The merger was ultimately cleared with the divestiture of MCI's interest in
certain Internet assets to Cable & Wireless PLC.72
A key issue for future cooperation is whether or not agreements allowing the exchange of
confidential information received from companies will soon be entered into. At present the
European Commission may only exchange confidential information with the consent of the
source concerned. However, the European Commission is dearly seeking the ability to exchange
information on a broader basis. It appears that the European Commission is hopeful that it
will get agreement from the member states for such exchanges if it limits the scope in the first
instance to hard-core cartels and the most serious cases of abuse of market power.
72. Se Justice Dparrmet Ckan WorldComIMCI Merger After MC Agrees to Sell Its Internet Business, Dept.
of Justice, July 15, 1998, availabk in 1998 WL 389299 ("there was a high degree of cooperation" between the
DOJ and the European Union).
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